<domain>
It works the same way as dkim-identity-fallback: if no key is found for the main identity, the fallback one is taken. It requires arc-identity to be set.
But its role is different. For the ordinary signature, falling back to your own identity is an exception: the client did not hand over a key, and that is a reason to investigate. A forwarder never has other people’s keys: it forwards mail from arbitrary senders and can attest it only on its own behalf.
Hence a simple conclusion: when forwarding, it is more sensible to set your own identity directly in arc-identity, and to keep this line for the case where some senders did hand over keys.
When forwarding, set your own identity as the main one. Keep the fallback for senders whose keys you have.
The identity must match the domain of the declaration domain-key or be its subdomain — like the main one.
Without arc-identity the line does not work. A requirement of the manual, not a recommendation.
# some senders handed over keys, the rest we attest on our own behalf domain-key key1, esp456.com, /etc/pmta/key1.esp456.com.pem <domain *> arc-sign yes arc-identity sender-or-from arc-identity-fallback @esp456.com</domain>
what people get wrong and how it ends2 mistakes▶
§ 3.3.10.37
our experience
2 relations
arc-sign<domain>Does nothing until forwarding sealing is enabled. § 3.3.10.37
pmta show settings gmail.com/vmta1 | grep -i arc-identity grep -i 'ARC-Message-Signature' /var/log/pmta/pmta.log | tail -3
3 articles
◇Do not send what will fail the check at the receiverThe node checks the SPF of its own mail before sending: if it fails, it bounces the message without waiting for someone else’s refusal.◇How the node signs messages and chooses a keyThe key is chosen by the sending domain from the headers, going through the declarations from top to bottom.◇A message header with which the submitting side adjusts the signatureFive parameters in X-DKIM-Options: selector, domain, signing identity, query method and key list.